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Integration of Migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions

Background paper for the session on:
International migration: promoting management and integration.

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Integration of Migrants: economic, social, cultural and political dimensions

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1. Introduction

This background paper is basically on integration processes of immigrants and minorities with a recent immigrant background, and policies related to the process of settlement of these newcomers in European societies. It thus excludes what are often called `regional minorities', like Frisians in the Netherlands, Basques in Spain and France. Although it is thus clearly related to immigration, the paper starts from the assumption that detailed information on (the history and present state of) immigration trends and stocks of immigrants is treated in other background papers for this conference. Here I only want to underline the general notion that experience with integration processes and policies in the different countries is closely related to their immigration experience and policies. Significant postwar immigration in Europe started early in North-West-European countries (1950s to 1970s), later in Southern Europe (1980s and 1990s) and very recent in Central and Eastern European countries (1990s). Experience with integration policies follows time-sequentially: we see the longest experience with integration policies in (some countries of) North-Western Europe, limited and recent efforts in the Southern countries, and practically an absence of such policies in East and Central Europe as yet. (These latter countries have often been confronted with the integration of regional minorities and/or minorities within their newly established or re-established borders that have been the consequence of formerly ´internal´ old migrations, a process in which different mechanisms are involved).

The consequence of these limitations is that this paper will inevitably lean heavily on North-West-European experience and lessons to be taken from research and policy there.

In principle, this paper will cover integration policies at all relevant levels: from the local level of municipalities and cities, to the national level of states, and the international level, which for North-West-Europe means first and foremost policies of the European Union. Within this general approach, however, I will put a strong emphasis on the local level, since that is the level where such policies have to be implemented and are felt primarily, both by the immigrants themselves and by those parts of society that are most affected by immigration.

In my effort to outline the ´state of the art´ in this domain I will take the following steps. In paragraph 2, I will outline the field: the context of European integration.
policies, their special relation with immigration policies, different types of policies and their possible convergence.

Having mapped the field roughly, I will explore the nature or ‘logic’ of integration processes, its conceptualization and lessons from empirical studies in paragraph 3. The reason to devote some space to these topics is based on the assumption that any integration policy should be based on a thorough, science-based knowledge of processes of integration and exclusion: if a policy wants to steer such a process, it should have a clear idea with which instruments it can possibly intervene, in which part of the process, at what particular moment.

Such knowledge is a solid starting point for policymaking, but it is not enough. The process of policymaking and implementation has its own logic, which does not necessarily run parallel to the logic of integration processes. That’s why I will turn to some basic notions of this logic in paragraph 4.

At the end of this paper I will return to the nexus of immigration and integration policies on the one hand, and to the relation between local, national and international integration policies on the other. What will probably be the future in this field?

2. Overview of (migration and) integration policies in Europe

The immigration-integration nexus

International migration has become a major phenomenon worldwide in recent decades. Europe has received a significant share of it. According to the OECD at the end of the 20th century more than 20 million foreigners were living in the countries of the European Economic Area (OECD 2001, 12). That amounts to 5.3 per cent of the total population in that area, and it does not include naturalised immigrants. Nor does it include undocumented immigrants or those waiting in asylum procedures or other situations. The recent IOM report (IOM 2003, 29), apparently using somewhat broader criteria, estimates the ‘migrant stocks’ in the whole European continent at more than 56 million, or 7.7% of the total population.

These migration movements have a variety of backgrounds and forms. In one direction, uneven development and political instability, combined with the intensity and reach of new communication media and the density of transport facilities, have generated greater migration pressures and supply-driven migration movements. In the
other direction, demographic and economic developments in Europe itself have given rise to new demand-driven movements towards some countries, and will presumably do so towards other countries in the near future.

The figures mentioned for Europe as a whole may be impressive in itself, they do not mirror the real impact of the new phenomenon, because migration and settlement patterns of immigrants turn out to basically uneven, both in space and in time. Some European countries, like Switzerland, Belgium and France, have a long pre-war history of immigration which was taken up again soon after WWII. Others have built up their immigration experience – mostly against their intention of becoming an immigration country – in the decades following WWII, for example the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Austria and The Netherlands. For a number of European countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, which used to be emigration countries until recently, the immigration experience builds on a period of just one decade or so. Obviously, such historical differences are reflected in the size of the immigrant population: the order in which the countries are mentioned above roughly corroborates with a decreasing percentage of their population of immigrant origin.

The impact, however, cannot only be measured by such figures. The perspective through which the phenomenon is perceived and defined is relevant. During the last three decades a common feature of all European countries has been their ad-hoc, reactive and control oriented character, in contradistinction with more explicit and pro-active policies of countries such as Canada, Australia and the United States. These classical immigration countries have a history in which immigration is a crucial element of the built up of their societies and they are aware of that. There is a basic acceptance of immigration and an elaborate institutional setting to handle it. Of course, immigration is discussed continuously there too, and both discourse on migration and its factual development changes over time, but still that basic acceptance is not fundamentally challenged. The common feature of Europe, on the contrary, is one of a basic non-acceptance of immigration.

Notwithstanding the fact that most North-West-European countries deliberately do not call themselves immigration countries, some of these countries even have higher immigration figures than classical immigration countries, measured simply by the percentage of foreign born within their total population. For example, Switzerland and the FRG have higher percentages than the United States of America.
So the facts of immigration are to a greater or lesser extent the same in these
countries, but the perception is not. This has pervasive consequences for how
immigrants are perceived and what place they are attributed in society in general and
in the political system in particularly, as we will see later. As a consequence
integration policies at the national level have been developed late in general, or not at
all, Sweden and the Netherlands being exceptional cases here. And if such policies
were formulated, this was often done as a consequence of crisis situations relating to
immigration or immigrants, and in most cases the result is piecemeal.

Within the emerging new context of the European Union such perceptions and
ensuing policies of member states may change in the future. The fresh ideas published
by the European Commission on new European immigration policies
(‘Communication on a Community Immigration Policy’ of November 22nd, 2000) and
on integration policies for immigrants (‘Communication on Immigration, Integration
and Employment’ of June 3rd, 2003) could in the long run promote more balanced,
pro-active and comprehensive policies within the EU. To be realistic, however, for the
moment the situation is one that does not fit to the present and future state of
migration and to the situation of immigrants: policies relating to immigration within
the EU-area are essentially ambivalent. On the one hand the EU created a sort of
fundamental right to migrate within the EU-area for citizens of member states, and
furthermore a more or less lenient policy is practiced in all states for highly skilled
and company linked migrants from outside the EU. On the other hand EU-member
states have developed a separately restrictive and defensive, but largely ineffective
immigration policies to keep out all other unasked for migrants; policies that has been
more politically driven – through the perception mentioned above – than research
based. Integration policies at EU-level are still in the phase of infancy.

European Union immigration policies are (in principle but not always in
practice) communitarian policies - competence of the European Commission - but
integration policies are not. Integration policies have remained in the so-called ‘Third
Pillar’, which means essentially that these are national policies. Any common
initiative can only be implemented by unanimous decisions of the Council of
Ministers. Context bound as such policies are, and to be developed in a less binding,
non-communitarian setting within the EU, it will take much time and efforts to
develop a common base for perceptions and action.
A typology of integration policies

In order to understand the present integration policies of European countries and their differences, I will first develop a basic typology as a tool. This typology is based on a simple analytical framework that centers around the concept of `citizenship'. Recently political theorists have contributed significantly to our thinking on citizenship, particularly when they have tried to answer the question how basic democratic values can and should be combined with the two essentials of any integration policy: cultural and religious diversity on the one hand and socio-economic equality on the other (Bauböck 1994; Bauböck et al. 1996; Brubaker 1989 and 1992; Hammar 1990; Kymlicka 1995; Soysal 1994; Young 1990).

For this typology I distinguish on the basis of scientific literature three different aspects or dimensions of citizenship. The first is the legal/political dimension: it refers to the basic question whether immigrants are regarded as fullfledged member of the political community. In practice the question is first of all whether alien immigrants do have secure residence rights, and if they have, in how far immigrants and ethnic minorities do have formal political rights and duties that differ from those of natives. This also includes the question whether newcomers may (easily or not) acquire national citizenship and thus gain access to the formal political system; it evidently also includes the granting (or not) of political rights to non-nationals, for example on the local level of cities. Also less formal political participation, such as through consultative structures for immigrants, are part of this dimension.

The second is the socio-economic dimension of citizenship: this pertains to social and economic rights of residents, irrespective of national citizenship; these include industrial rights and rights related to institutionalized facilities in the socio-economic sphere. Do they have (equal) rights to accept work and to use institutional facilities to find it? Do they have the same rights as indigenous workers? Do they have access to work related benefits, like unemployment benefits and insurance, and to the state-provided social security facilities, like social housing, social assistance and welfare and care facilities.

The third dimension pertains to the domain of cultural and religious rights of immigrants: do they have (equal) rights to organize and manifest themselves as cultural, ethnic or religious groups? Are they recognized, accepted and treated like other comparable groups and do they enjoy the same or comparable facilities?

These three essential dimensions of citizenship can be reformulated for the purpose of analysis of policies of national and local governments as aspects of integration and used as yardsticks to construct a typology of integration policies. If we attribute for the sake of simplicity only two qualities to each of the dimensions
defined above - one positive quality meaning the explicit support in policy for the
dimension concerned (indicated with a (+) in the figure), and one negative meaning
that that same dimension is denied support in policies (indicated with a (-) in the
figure) - we have created a typology space of possible forms of policies:

**A Typology space of migrant integration policies:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>INCLUSION</th>
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<th>EXCLUSION</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Cultural-religious</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>dimension</td>
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From this simple typology a number of things become clear. The first and most
important distinction is the one between inclusive and exclusive policies, based on the
legal-political dimension: if migrants or immigrants are not regarded as (potentially)
part of the political community of the country or city of settlement, and if their
legal/political position is defined as essentially different from national citizens, I will
call these exclusionist policies (types 4, 5 and 6). Among these are the so called `guest
worker policies' after the Second World War. Such migration was defined as
temporary, and thus exclusionist: types 4, 5 and 6. Dutch policies until 1980, for
example, fitted perfectly type 4, since it combined political exclusion and a special
legal position of these alien guests with in principle equal rights in the socio-
economic sphere and a policy of `retaining cultural and religious identity' in view of
their anticipated return. Austrian and Swiss guest worker policies have fitted, and still
do to a great extent, to types 5 or 6 in the sense that they combine political exclusion
with unequal industrial and social rights of foreign workers.
Policies of North-West-European countries have moved in the course of time within the typology space. In the late 1970s and 1980s, for example, countries such as Sweden, The Netherlands, Belgium and France have explicitly acknowledged that most of the (former) labour migrants would be settling for good and that more inclusive policies were necessary (Vermeulen 1997). These countries have, among other things, changed their naturalization laws and/or practices in order to facilitate access to formal citizenship, most prominently for the children of immigrants. Sometimes they have added opportunities for formal political participation of legally residing aliens at the local level or have devised group-specific forms of consultation and participation.

Not all European countries, however, have made such a change in definitions and policies, or at least not to the same extent. Austrian and Swiss national policies, for example, still reflect to a large extent the premises of guestworker policies. Germany made a significant step towards a more inclusionist policy in 1991 with a relative easing its formerly tough naturalization regulations.

Against this background of continental Europe, the United Kingdom represents a different case: there is no such tradition as a 'guest worker scheme' and the great majority of those who immigrated to the UK was entitled to or possessed already a British passport upon arrival. Alienness and nationality are not significant characteristics: it was and is the racial or ethnic descent that is the relevant paradigm. The British case, being one that is inclusionist in the formal sense from the beginning, makes us aware of the distinction between formal inclusion and inclusion in practice. Inclusion in the political-juridical domain turns out to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to attain equality.

Although national migrant policies in Europe in the legal/political domain have developed more common elements (see Weil 2000), quite substantial differences remain. Such differences are related to basic ideas about membership of the political community in different countries: Germany, for example, defines its national community in ethnic terms of ancestry, and thus welcomes resettlers (Aussiedler) as Germans returning to the fatherland, but regards settled foreigners as Ausländer, as 'alien elements'. The French republican conception, in contradistinction, is based on a political contract between individual citizens and the state, a contract that anyone who subscribes the principles of that political system may enter into. The fact that such principles in the French case are strongly embedded in culturally defined institutions, however, makes things complicated for those immigrants that have different cultural and religious backgrounds. Also here the political-juridical inclusion seems to be a necessary, but not necessarily a sufficient condition for full integration.
Of course a different terminology goes with such different conceptions: more exclusionist policies talk about ‘aliens’, ‘Ausländer’, ‘guest workers’ and other designations that accentuate the (supposed) temporal stay or the belonging of a person to another political unity. Terminology and content of such policies reflect basically the non-acceptance of immigration and of newcomers as permanent immigrants. In inclusionist policies on the contrary, ‘immigrant’ is an accepted term like in France, or the term ethnic minorities is adopted as in the case of the UK and the Netherlands, the term reflecting on the one hand the fact that a group (of immigrants) is part of the political community, but has on the other hand a specific place in that community in relation to the dominant majority.

Turning to the second and third dimension and looking particularly at inclusionist policies, I firstly remark that type 3 theoretically does not exist in Western Europe at this moment: liberal democracies principally do not allow for inequality and unequal rights for those who are regarded as members of the political community. Type 3 may, however, exist in practice, as far as racism and discrimination is given space to overthrow such high principles of equality.

In terms of official policies, however, we find the second important distinction within inclusionist policies in Europe: between type 1 that stands for multiculturalist and/or diversity policies on the one hand and type 2, that pertains to those forms of integration policies that are primarily based on assimilationist premises. Multicultural policies of type 1 presuppose not only political inclusion and equality in the socio-economic domain, but also aim at cultural and religious equity. The basic premise of multiculturalism, defined as a set of normative notions on how to shape a multicultural society politically, is that immigrants cannot become equal citizens unless state and society accept that both individuals and groups have the right to cultural difference. According to multiculturalists, the prevailing institutions and rules in society are historical and cultural products that are not neutral for newcomers and thus may need revision in order to accommodate newcomers. UK-, Dutch and Swedish policies in the 1980s and early 1990s have presented themselves as multiculturalist policies, following that line of reasoning. Integration policies of type 2, in contradistinction, take the state and society of settlement as ‘given’, also in the cultural and normative sense. Newcomers are supposed to adapt at least to the public institutions of that society. This may lead to strong assimilation pressure. French policies have traditionally been associated with this type, although in recent years also In France a plea for ‘la droit a la difference (the right to be different) is gaining weight.
Convergence of policies?

The definitions of the different types of policy described above are ideal types. As mentioned earlier, I have given only two extreme qualities on each dimension: positive or negative. In practice the divides between them are much fuzzier and they develop in the course of time. An important question is then whether positions have been moving in the same direction and whether there is convergence in European integration policies.

Taking back again the distinction between the three domains, we have to conclude that the extent of convergence that has occurred is not equally strong in each of these domains. There has been some convergence in the political-juridical domain: for example, in all member states, minimum EU rules will apply to residence rights of large groups of 'third-country nationals'. Also the wide disparities between French and German naturalization legislation have narrowed. In recent years there have been increasing appeals in Germany to enable children of immigrants to gain citizenship more easily. The *jus sanguinis* principle is thus being relaxed and the *jus soli* principle is being considered, while in France the opposite is happening.

The clearest pressure for convergence is in the socio-economic domain, particularly in work related rights and facilities. Normsetting laws, rules and directives of the European commission, based on the premisses of equal rights and non-discrimination, assisted by trade union pressure within national contexts, have contributed to much more uniformity than before in work-related situations. This is much less the case, however, when it comes to accessibility and equal rights in the domain of welfare state facilities such as social assistance and benefits, social housing, education and health.

The largest disparities still exist in the cultural-religious domain. Policies related to the two most important elements in this domain, those of language and religion, show little evidence of convergence. British, Swedish and Dutch policies, inspired by multiculturalist ideologies, stand here in opposition to French, German and Austrian policies that – for different reasons – do not give much room for immigrants to cultural and religious manifestation in the public sphere. Awareness of the need to have such policies varies significantly and pressure of European institutions is not strong here. One of the basic problems is that language and religion are often tightly bound up with notions of national identity. Diversity policies are then easily perceived as threatening that national identity. Nevertheless some signs of convergence can be seen, often at the local level, for example in the recognition of muslims as negotiating partners and rudimentary institutionalization of so called 'new'
religions. But at the same time there are still wide disparities with regard to religious instruction in state schools and opportunities for religiously based schools.

3. The logic of processes of integration and exclusion: lessons from research for policies

Having mapped the field roughly, I will now explore the nature of integration processes, its conceptualization and lessons from research.

Defining integration and relevant levels and actors in integration processes

Newcomers in a given society are often perceived as the classic `other', who does not belong there. This observation has been the starting point of a long tradition of research initiated by early founders of sociology like Simmel (1908) and refined by scholars like Park and Burgess (1921) and Elias and Scotson (1965).

Constructions of the `other' or `stranger' may be based on various grounds: on legal status (aliens), on physical appearance (`race'), on (perceived) cultural and religious differences, on class characteristics or on any combination of these elements. Such constructions do not only have consequences for interpersonal relations, they also play out on the collective level, defining in-groups and out-groups. They may express themselves in discriminatory practices and lead to deteriorating interethnic relations and weakening of social cohesion in communities, cities and states. On the political level the `otherness' may also be exploited, for example by anti-immigrant movements or parties.

At the moment immigrants settle they have to acquire a place in the new society, both in the physical sense (a house, a job and income, access to educational and health facilities, etc), but also in the social and cultural sense. Particularly if newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society as physically, culturally and/or religiously `different', they aspire to acquire also in these respects a recognized place in that new society and become accepted. It is from these observations that we deduce a basic and at the same time comprehensive definition of integration: the process of becoming an accepted part of society. This elementary definition of integration is – on purpose – open in two ways. Firstly, it emphasizes the processual character rather than defining an end situation. Secondly, it does not state the particular requirements for acceptance by the receiving society (in contradistinction to the normative models that have been developed by political theorists that we
mentioned in the foregoing paragraph) thereby leaving different temporal (in-between) and final outcomes open. That makes the definition more useful for the empirical study of these processes, allowing us to capture more of its diversity.

The open, elementary definition of integration covers at least three analytically distinct dimensions of becoming an accepted part of society, as described in the foregoing paragraph where we discussed citizenship: the legal/political, the socio-economic dimension and the cultural/religious one. The first dimension conditions the other ones in two ways. From the perspective of individual immigrants the legal position and related rights allocated to them may have significant positive or negative consequences for their behaviour and their efforts to integrate. Long periods of uncertainty about future residence (and dependency in the case of asylum seekers), and not having access to local and/or national political systems and decision making, for example, obviously has negative implications for the migrant’s preparedness and efforts to integrate. From the perspective of the receiving society such excluding policies are an expression of basic perceptions that look at immigrants as ‘outsiders’, an attitude that is not inviting for active policies in the socio-economic and cultural-religious domain. Exclusionary policies thus have negative effects on integration processes. Turning this reasoning around, there are solid indications that where inclusion of immigrants in formal and informal channels of political participation does take place, this leads to (admittedly different) forms of active policies in the socio-economic and cultural-religious domain (For relevant empirical material on the level of cities see for example: Alexander 2003; Boussetta 1997; Fennema/Tillie 1999 and 2001; Moore 2001, Penninx et al. 2004 and Rogers/Tillie 2000).

Having defined the key concept of integration and its dimensions the next question is: who are the actors involved? There are basically two parties involved in integration processes: the immigrants with their characteristics, efforts and adaptation, and the receiving society and its characteristics and reactions to these newcomers. It is the interaction between the two that determines the direction and temporal and final outcomes of the integration process. However, these two are fundamentally unequal partners in terms of (political) power and resources. The receiving society, its institutional structure and its reactions to newcomers are therefore much more decisive for the outcome of the process. Integration policies are part of the institutional arrangements in a society, particularly since we should define such policies broadly as including both general policies and their effects for immigrants, and policies that
carry the explicit flag of integration of immigrants. Such policies being defined politically by (majorities of) the receiving society there is the inherent danger of being lop-sided, representing expectations and demands of this society, or dominant parts of it, rather than being based on participation, negotiation and agreement with immigrant groups themselves.

The foregoing alinea indicates that processes of integration of immigrants are thus not – as is often supposed – only taking place at the level of the individual immigrant, whose integration is then measured in terms of his/her housing, job and education, and his/her social and cultural adaptation to the new society. It also takes place at the collective level of the immigrant group. Organisations of immigrants are the expression of mobilized resources and ambitions, and may become an accepted part of civil society (and a potential partner for integration policies), or they may isolate themselves or they may get excluded by the society of settlement.

A third level on which processes of integration take place is the level of institutions. (I use here the sociological concept of institution: a standardized, structured and common way of acting in a socio-cultural setting.) Two kinds of institutions are of particular relevance. The first are general public institutions of receiving societies or cities, such as the educational system, institutional arrangements in the labour market or for public health, or for that matter the political system. Such general institutions are supposed to serve all citizens, and equally so. Laws, regulations and executive organisations, but also unwritten rules and practices are part of these. These general institutions, however, may hinder access or equal outcomes for immigrants and ethnic minorities in two ways. Firstly, they may formally exclude them, completely (as does the political system in most countries and cities with respect to alien immigrants) or partially (as often social security and welfare systems offer only partial service to alien immigrants). Secondly, if access for all residents including immigrants is in principle guaranteed, such institutions may hinder access and/or equal outcomes for immigrants and ethnic minorities by their – historically and culturally determined – ways of operating, not taking into account specific characteristics of the migrants’ situation caused by their migration history, their cultural and religious background, or language. The functioning of these general public institutions (and the possible adjustment of them in view of growing diversity) is thus of paramount importance: it is particularly on this level that integration and exclusion are mirrored concepts (see Penninx 2001 on social exclusion).
The second kind of institutions that are of particular relevance for integration comprise the ones that are specific of and for immigrant groups, such as religious or cultural institutions. The value and validity of such institutions, in contradistinction to general institutions, is limited to those who voluntarily choose for and adhere to them. Although their place is primarily in the private sphere, such specific institutions may manifest themselves also in the public sphere as important actors of civil society, as the history of churches, trade unions, cultural and leisure institutions, institutions of professions in European cities and states has shown. Such specific – migrant related - institutions may become an accepted part of society on the same level as comparable institutions of native groups, or they may isolate themselves or remain unrecognized and excluded.

The mechanisms working at the individual, the organizational and the institutional level are different, but the results on each of these levels are clearly interrelated. Institutional arrangements determine to a great extent the opportunities and scope for action of organisations. They may also exert a significant influence on the development and orientation of immigrant organisations, as Fennema and Tillie (in Penninx et al. 2004) have shown. Institutions and organisations together, in their turn, create the structure of opportunities and limitations for individuals. The other way around individuals may mobilize and change the landscape of organisations, and potentially contribute to significant changes in institutional arrangements. In view of the unevenness of power and resources that we mentioned before, however, such examples are scarce, though not absent.

I will illustrate the interconnectedness of integration processes on different levels by comparing the development of the position of Turkish muslims in the Netherlands and in the Federal Republic of Germany (Penninx 2000). These immigrants came in the same period, for the same reasons and with roughly the same characteristics, but policy reactions to Islam and the Turkish group differed markedly in the two countries. The Netherlands introduced an ‘ethnic minorities policy’ in the early 1980s, which implied among others an official recognition of Islam on the same footing as other religions, thus opening opportunities for its public manifestation (Rath et al. 2001). It also entailed recognition of (islamic) organisations (as potential partners in integration policies). In turn, this implied ongoing relations and negotiations between these organizations and authorities both for the public regulation of specific facilities for Islam in the Netherlands (helal slaughtering, mosque building,
public call for prayer, public Islamic broadcasting, state funded Islamic schools, etc.)
and for integration activities by Islamic organisations for their rank and file. In
contradistinction, Germany (although differently in the different Länder and cities, as
is shown in the Berlin, Cologne and Frankfurt cases) has in general been much less
engaging.

The interesting result of these diverging policies relating to specific
institutional arrangements for Islam and to Islamic organisations is that on the
individual level attitudes towards the receiving country and towards integration,
particularly as measured among young and second generation Turks in the
Netherlands and the FRG, seem to differ markedly. The results of Heitmeyer’s
research in the FRG (Heitmeyer et al. 1997) and a comparable survey done by Sunier
in the Netherlands (Sunier 1996 and 1999) illustrate this point. While the former study
registers inward-oriented and even fundamentalist attitudes on an alarming scale, the
latter one signals a much more positive attitude towards integration and involvement,
particularly in local society. (Sunier’s observations in Rotterdam in the mid-1990 are
confirmed by a recent study of Canatan et al. (2003) on the role of mosques in
Rotterdam in the wider social context of the city and their integration activities.) This
goes together with more critical and independent views on established Islamic
umbrella organisations like Milli Görüs, headquartered in the FRG. (See also for the
FRG: Karakasoglu 1997; Karakasoglu & Koray 1996; Oezbek & Koray 1998; For
the Netherlands see: Doomernik 1991; Landman 1992; Rath et al. 2001).

Finally, I want to highlight another important element of the logic of integration
processes: the time factor. Processes of integration of newcomers are long term by their
nature. At the individual level, an adult immigrant may adapt significantly in the
cognitive dimension of his behaviour: it is both pragmatic and pays off rather
immediately if you learn how things are done, by whom etc. Adaptation of adults in the
aesthetic and normative dimensions of their behaviour, however, tends to be less easy:
knowledge may change, but feelings and likings, and evaluations of good and evil are
pretty persistent within an individual’s lifetime. This is a general rule for mankind, but it
becomes more manifest in those who change basic environments through migration.

The situation of the descendants of this ‘first generation’ of migrants differs
normally in this respect. Through primary relations within their family and the network
of the immigrant community they are familiarized with the immigrant community, and
possibly with its background elsewhere. At the same time, however, they become
thoroughly acquainted with culture and language of the society of settlement through informal contacts in the neighbourhood from their early childhood and particularly through their participation in general institutions, the educational one in the first place. If such a double process of socialization takes place under favourable conditions (in which policies play a major role) this second generation develops a way of life and lifestyle in which they combine the roles, identities and loyalties of these different worlds and situations. Ways to do this are manifold, which makes for more and more differentiation within the original immigrant group. At the group level this means that the litmus test for integration, and for the success or failure of policies in this field, is the position of the second generation.

Plurality of outcomes, diversity of policies

If the integration process results from the interaction of two parties that takes place at different levels, as I have posited so far, and if we add the differentiating effect of time and generations, what can we expect in terms of outcomes? Comparative studies provide clear answers on this point, namely that plurality of outcomes is the rule. A first category of studies compares the integration process of different immigrant groups in the same institutional and policy context of a nation or a city: these reveal that immigrant groups follow different patterns of integration or incorporation. For the Dutch case, for example, Vermeulen and Penninx (2000) have shown that Moluccan, Surinamese, Antillean, Southern European, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants differ in the speed of their integration and in the tracks they tend to follow. The consequence of the design of such studies, however, is that explanation for such differences are found primarily in characteristics of the immigrant groups, simply because the (national or city) context in which they are being integrated is the same.

A second category of cross-national comparative studies looking at the integration of the same group in different national contexts, does exactly the opposite: such studies also find differences in outcome, but these are primarily ascribed to the differential functioning of the context in which the group is integrated. Also here differences turn out to be significant, as was shown already in Penninx's observations on muslims in The FRG and The Netherlands. It is additionally illustrated in two studies of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies of the Universiteit van Amsterdam. The first one compares the institutionalization of Islam in The Netherlands, Belgium and the U.K. in the postwar period (Rath et al. 2001), and finds markedly different outcomes as
a consequence of institutional arrangements and traditions of public acceptance of religions in these societies, and the subsequent difference in interaction. The second study is one on the attitudes and actions of trade unions in relation to immigration and the position of immigrants in society in seven European countries (Penninx/Roosblad 2000). Also here remarkable differences become evident. For example, the high degree of membership of Turkish immigrants in Sweden (above 90 %) and the low degree of this same group in France (around 15 %) turns out to be basically the consequence of how trade unions are organized and are incorporated in (or not) socio-economic decisionmaking at the national level.

A recent empirical research project on `Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship’ (MPMC) in 17 European cities shows the heterogeneity of the two parties on an even more intensive scale. Looking at the immigrants first, the background of their migration and selectivity that goes with it, are very divers in both time and space. Part of the migration movements towards Europe’s cities has a background of colonial relations with the country of destination, clearly visible in cities like Amsterdam, Birmingham, Lisbon and Marseille. Another part goes back to – again selective – demand-driven migration of mainly low skilled workers, some of it with a long history as in Swiss, Belgian and French cities, others of a more recent origin in the post-war decades. And all countries and cities received a varying share of the mixed immigrant flows of the last three decades: significant supply-driven movements of refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants, often along with highly skilled cosmopolitan professionals and company linked migrants. The total picture emerging from this is not only a significant growth in diversity of origin (from mainly European to more and more global nowadays), but also of marked differences in social and cultural capital that immigrants bring with them and/or have developed during their stay.

Variability is also strong, if we turn our eye to the other partner involved. The 17 cities show great variety in their institutional settings and their policies and reactions to immigrants (see Alexander 2003). Some of this variance can be explained by differences of the national institutional systems in which cities are embedded, but there are a great many local factors and circumstances that add to more variability of local reactions and policies: local political constellations and coalitions that may work for inclusion or exclusion, the physical built up of the city and its relation with the neighbouring area (compare Paris and Berlin before 1991), the historical experience with earlier immigration and diversity, the concrete instruments and resources available to local
policy makers to steer processes in the vital domains of (social) housing and urban regeneration, of the labour market and entrepreneurship, of education and health.

**Policy lessons**

In my view there are some important lessons to be drawn from these general observations on the logic of integration processes. Reformulated as lessons for policymaking – and here I combine research findings with normative assumptions – I see three essential lessons. The first is that a key condition for effective integration policy is transparency of admission of immigrants and their residential and legal status. Expectations of, and actual long-term-residence should be expressed in an adequate legal position and opportunities to participate in politics and policymaking, especially in policies that affect their position. Cities are in this juridical/political domain to a great extent dependent on (immigration, integration and naturalization) policies at the national level, but not completely. They may develop effective alternative channels for participation, thereby creating a city-related form of inclusion and citizenship as was shown in the MPMC-project (Penninx et al. 2004).

Secondly, integration policies should be comprehensive in the dimensions and domains covered, thereby signifying that they do not only represent concern of the native majority, but also build on needs from the perspective of the immigrants. The economic and the social domains, particularly labour market, education, housing and health are priority domains. Policies in the political and cultural domain (including religion), however, are indispensable over the long term for integration. The forms that such policies may take depend in practice very much on the existing institutional arrangements in receiving societies and cities, and on the political willingness to change these to become gradually more inclusive.

Thirdly, (local) integration policies should follow strategies and tactics that engage the partners in the integration process at different levels. It should combine `top down’ activation elements with `bottom up’ mobilization. It should define the process of integration as `open’, within the rules of liberal-democratic societies, leaving room for a more divers, but cohesive society as a result. The diversity reached in this way is neither predetermined nor static, but negotiated, shared and ever changing.
4. The logic of politics and policymaking

Policies intend to steer processes in society, in our case integration processes of immigrants in society. As stated in the introduction of this paper, we need not only a thorough insight in the logic of integration processes in order to formulate and implement effective policies, we also have to get such policies politically approved and backed up. The logic of politics and policymaking, however, is one of a different kind and often problematic in relation to immigrants.

Majority-minority relations and political participation

Above I have formulated as a key condition for effective policies that actual long-term-residence should be expressed in an adequate legal position and opportunities to participate in politics and policymaking, especially in policies that affect their position. Here I observe that the existing political system often blocks such a condition. The political fate of the Suessmuth-report (2001) in the FRG is an outstanding example, but surely not the only one. But this also plays for local policies as is aptly shown by Hans Mahnig (in Penninx et al. 2004) in his comparison of the cities of Berlin, Paris and Zurich. The conundrum is here that decisions on integration policies and their content and orientation, are taken in a political system in which the majority vote decides. In such a system majority-minority relations and the actual or perceived clash of interests connected to them are played out both on the national level and in cities. This may lead to outright exclusion of part of the immigrants (aliens) from the formal political system, or it may – in case they are (partially) included - marginalize their voice. Perceptions of immigrants turn out to be important in such a process, often more than facts (see the observations on national immigration policies in paragraph 2). This is the more so, if the issues of immigration and the position of immigrants become politicized questions. This mechanism leads either to the absence of integration policies and avoidance of issues related to immigrants, or to lop-sided and patronizing policies reflecting mainly majority interests and disregarding needs and voice of immigrants.

Although this is the rule in Europe, both on the national and local level, exceptions exist both at the local and at the national level. Some of the British cities may serve as local examples. Most of their immigrants being of ex-colonial origin and having UK-citizenship, the starting point of the process is a basically open political system from beginning. This does not prevent significant polarization of majority-minority relations,
as a wealth of literature in the UK and the case study of Garbaye on Birmingham testifies (in Penninx et al. 2004) but in the course of time the significant concentration of immigrants in certain districts, combined with political coalitions with powerful parties, may lead to substantive political participation in cities. Crises in such cities have reinforced this process. Thus cities, rather than states, may play a prominent role in establishing new practices of political participation.

A different trajectory towards more political participation and inclusive integration policies is shown by Swedish and Dutch societies and their cities. In both these countries rather comprehensive integration policies have been introduced at the national level in a period in which immigration and immigrant integration was much less politicized: in Sweden in the mid-1970s and The Netherlands beginning of the 1980s. In both cases there existed also an active and fruitful relation between research and policy in this field. These conditions have promoted the early establishment of liberal and inclusive measures and policies in these countries, leading among other things to the early introduction of local voting rights for aliens (Sweden in 1976, The Netherlands 1985) and easier access to naturalisation for (a significant part of) newcomers. Such novelties (at that time) were introduced by the conviction and awareness that forces within migrant groups need to be mobilized to have policies accepted and implemented and cohesion created. Naturalisation and local voting rights were seen as means to promote integration, rather than as final testimony of acquired integration.

The trajectories and achievements described above for (cities in) the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, however, do seem to be exceptional as yet. In most other cases of the cities of the MPMC-project the stimulating factors mentioned above have been absent. The question when, and what kind of policies are developed in these cities seems to be closely related to the urgency of the situation, crises situations often leading to actions and policies that strongly and lop-sidedly reflects perceptions and interests of locally dominant groups.

If integration policies are accepted an additional aspect of the logic of policymaking emerges. In contradistinction to the long-term-nature of integration processes discussed above, the political process in democratic societies requires policies to bear fruits within much shorter – in between election – terms. Unrealistic promises and demands derived from such a 'democratic impatience' (Vermeulen/Penninx 1994) - that is the political desire to have quick solutions for problems and processes of a long-
term character - often leads to backlashes. The recent vigorous debate on the (supposed) failure of integration policies in the Netherlands is a good example.

More difficult than democratic impatience, however, is the situation in which the political climate (of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments, translated in political movements and politicization of the topics of immigration and integration) prevent well argued policy proposals from being accepted. Unfortunately, this has become the case in several European countries and cities, the Zurich example as described by Mahnig (in Penninx et al. 2004) being an extreme example of this. It means that much more attention should be given to the question of how to frame immigration and integration policies politically in such a way, that these are acceptable and accepted by the ruling political system.

Implementing policy: contents and strategies
All foregoing observations relate to the political process that may or may not lead to the establishment of explicit integration policies. I add here some observations on the form and content of such policies, if they have been established. First of all, as I have indicated earlier integration policies are by necessity context bound. It is implicated in the answer to the question IN WHAT immigrants are supposed to integrate. On the level of states differences between countries in the ideologies and practical models through which they incorporate (alien) immigrants have received rather systematic attention (See a.o. Bauböck et al. 1996; Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1998; Favell 2000; Freeman 1995 IMR; Guiraudon 1998; Hammar 1985; Soysal 1994;).

But apart from such specific migrant-related differences also general characteristics of states and societies matter. In the socio-economic sphere, for example, integration mechanisms in societies with a strong liberal market orientation (and limited welfare and social facilities) differ from those in caring welfare states that are more based on solidarity and redistribute a much greater part of the national income. Also in the cultural and religious domain historical peculiarities of institutional arrangements create significant differences in the feasibility of policies in certain domains. By consequence the scope, actors and instruments of policy action differ.

This context-bound nature is illustrated by Vermeulen (1997) who compares immigrant policies in five European countries since the 1960s, specifically relating to a) integration and labour market policies; b) policies relating to immigrant languages, and c) policies in relation to religious systems introduced by immigrants. It shows basically
that the actual content of integration policies is to a great extent dependent on, or
inspired by the pre-existent institutional arrangements in these domains within the
different countries. For a country that traditionally had different recognized languages
within its territory (or religions for that matter), it is in principle easier to make
additional provisions for newcomers in this domain. In the same vein Vermeulen and
Slijper (2003) analyse the practice of multicultural policies in Canada, Australia and the
USA. Multiculturalism differs not only in terms of its historical development in each of
these countries, the practice of it turns out to be clearly context bound. Both examples
pertain to the national level of states, but the same rule holds for the level of cities, as the
MPMC-study (Penninx et al. 2004) and the comparative analysis of city policies of
Michael Alexander (2003) has shown.

In their turn local variations in institutional arrangement and opportunities for
integration policies and participation of immigrants may to a significant extent be
explained by diverging national policies, institutional settings and their underlying
conceptions, as the body of cross-national research suggests. Embedded as cities are in
their national contexts, they necessarily reflect national policies and conceptions. I will
demonstrate this on the basis of the political `problem definition’ of immigrants and
their integration on the national level, and the ensuing strategies to be applied in these
policies.

A first prototypical definition is the one that defines the immigrant principally as
an alien and outsider, who is only temporarily part of society. That society is
emphatically not defining itself as an immigration country and migrants are therefore
temporary `guests’. At best measures may be taken to make that temporary stay
comfortable and profitable for both parties and to facilitate their anticipated return, but
there is no logical ground for inclusive policies that would incorporate these immigrants
as full citizens or political actors. Such an exclusionary definition leads to the kind of
policies that Michael Alexander (2003) in his typology calls either `non-policy’ or
`guestworker policy’. Forms and instruments of such policies are variant and accidental,
being mostly ad-hoc reactions to concrete problems.

In contradistinction to such exclusionary policies, we also find definitions that in
principle include immigrants in the course of time. In the way this inclusion is
envisaged, however, two distinct political definitions of immigrants and their integration
can be discerned. The first one is prototypically formulated in the French, republican
vision, in which – as a consequence of its vision on the state, its relation to citizens, the
ensuing political system and institutional arrangements in the public sphere – the
distinction between citizens and aliens is crucial and alien immigrants should preferably
become citizens and thus become recognized as individual political actors. Immigrant
collectivities are not recognized as such. French republican terminology avoids notions
like ethnicity, ethnic minorities, multiculturalism that suggest collectiveness and
institutionalized difference of any sort, be it origin, culture, religion or class. (Formal)
equality on the individual level is the overriding political principle. In this sense this
definition principally depoliticizes the issue of immigrants and their integration (which
does not prevent immigration becoming an overriding issue of established parties).

The second prototypical inclusionary vision is the Anglo-American one, in
which also immigrants are supposed to have or take up citizenship individually, but
having done so, the political system leaves much room for collective manifestation and
action of immigrants. Ethnicity and ethnic minorities are perceived as relevant notions,
even to the extent that the total population in censuses for example is officially registered
as such. Although also in this political vision equality is an important principle, there is
the additional notion that substantive equality may in practice be related to membership
of cultural, ethnic, immigrant or disadvantaged groups. Political struggle between groups
on issues of multiculturalism is thus an explicit part of politics (irrespective of the
outcomes of such political struggles).

The internal logic of these prototypical inclusive visions leads to different
strategies employed in integration policies. The first French Republican system leads
principally to strategies that choose for general policies, equality within the given system
as priority, avoidance of designating fixed target groups and non-recognition of
collective manifestations and organizations as important actors. The inherent problem of
such a definition is that of mobilizing and engaging forces from within immigrant groups
(which are feared as counteracting integration) in the implementation of policies. The
second vision tends to be more inclined to designate target groups and formulate group-
specific policies, even to the extent that positive discrimination or affirmative action may
be part of such policies; it is more prone to recognize, if not stimulate, forms of
representation of such groups, for example by extending subsidies directly to immigrant
organizations, or indirectly by subsidizing certain activities of such groups; this vision is
also more inclined to combine equality with cultural difference, implying recognition of
cultural and religious aspect of integration processes.
On purpose we have outlined these two models of inclusion as prototypical contrasting ones in order to illustrate their internal logic. In practice we see many variations and eclectic *bricolage* of the elements of both visions in the definitions and instruments of policies. This is the case both on the national and the city level (see Penninx et al. 2004). The elements of this bricolage, moreover, may also change in the course of time.

Differences in (national and local) contexts thus lead to divergence and to integration policies in plurality, so runs the argument in the preceding section. But how does the picture look like, if we bring together evidence and arguments for convergence?

Several cross-national studies indicate forms of convergence, be it hesitant and partial ones. Vermeulen (1997, 150-152) listed earlier a number of issues that show at least some convergence. Firstly, in immigration policy, particularly the part of the residential status regulations for immigrants of non EU-countries, the European Commission has issued in recent years a number of directives that partially harmonize member state policies. Secondly, some convergence has also occurred in naturalisation policies. For example, the wide disparities between French and German legislation and practice in this field have narrowed: the *jus sanguinis* element in the FRG-legislation is thus being relaxed and the *jus soli* principle is introduced to enable children of immigrants to gain citizenship more easily, while in France the *jus soli* principle has lost ground in recent years. The recent studies of Weil (2001) and Hansen and Weil (2001) on methods of adjudicating nationality to aliens confirms the convergence tendency on a wider scale in Europe. Thirdly, Vermeulen also sees some convergence in the use of a common terminology that is particularly encouraged by supranational organisations. He warns, however, that such common vocabulary of “integration” and “multicultural” may be deceptive: “Using the same words does not necessarily mean people agree in their ideas. It could even serve to create the illusion of agreement.”

Obviously, there are specific forces at work at the local level that lead to convergence. It seems that the strong local character of the settlement process of immigrants itself acts as a force towards convergence of policies. Whatever the institutional arrangements is, local authorities have to find answers to the same questions, such as how to provide immigrants with adequate housing and jobs, how to make educational and health facilities available for them, but also how to react to their demands to fulfill religious obligations or facilities to use and teach their mother
tongues. They furthermore have to deal with very similar reactions of the native population to immigrants, and processes of discrimination and social exclusion. Neglecting and avoiding these questions is easier at the more distant level of national policies, but in cities the questions make themselves concretely felt, the more so, if the number of immigrants and their concentration in certain parts the city increase. If city authorities do not address such questions on their own initiative, they may be forced to do so by emerging crises. ‘Inner city riots’ as they are often called in the UK, or the banlieu-problematique in France are illustrations of triggers to may lead to (new) policies for and of cities. In this sense such crises may be seen as ‘bottom-up’ forces for convergence.

A logical consequence of such area specific manifestations as triggers for policies is that these policies are often framed as space-specific policies in which housing, concentration and segregation are central issues. The ‘Inner City Policies’ in the UK since 1968 and the ‘Politique de la Ville’ in France since the 1990s illustrates this. (As I described earlier the coming together of integration policies for immigrants and urban policies in Sweden and the Netherlands has a different background).

Such forces do not only stimulate the emergence of policies and influence the content of them, in their implementation they also tend encourage in the end similar strategies. In some cases consultation of immigrants and engagement of individuals and organisations in the implementation is part of policies from the beginning, as the Manchester case described by Moore (in Penninx et al. 2004) illustrates. If this is not the case, however, it often becomes clear soon that it is impossible to effectively implement immigrant policies without linking into the immigrant groups themselves and engaging these in the formulation and implementation. The Marseille and Toulouse cases of Moore (in Penninx et al. 2004) illustrates adequately how the city authorities there have found informal ways of linking into immigrant groups by recruiting mediators from them. The Oeiras case shows another form of solution for the same problem: while not recognizing the immigrant status or ethnicity as a relevant criterion, the Town Hall simply uses existing neighbourhood, sport and leisure organisations that happen to be mainly immigrant organizations (Marques/Santos in Penninx et al. 2004). These and other examples suggest that conditions for effective implementation lead to a certain convergence in the strategy used, although the forms may differ.
Policy lessons

Here again – giving a normative turn to these observations on the logic of policymaking – some lessons can be taken from them. The first is that to get policies established we not only need a solid scientific knowledge of the logic of integration processes, but also an adequate political definition that makes such policies politically acceptable and endorsed. What is needed is a balanced framework which does not hide problems to be solved, but primarily stresses the common interest of all. There is much to be gained here: not only avoiding crises, that are shown to be inevitable, if problems are consistently neglected, but also restoring and promoting cohesiveness of cities and states that makes it possible to reap the potential fruits of immigration and immigrants. Acceptance of immigrants and their active participation is an essential condition in such a framework. Negotiated new forms of diversity will result from it. On this front there is still much work to do, for all actors but for politicians primarily.

A second lesson is that the viability of integration policies in the long term depends heavily on realistic targets to be attained and an adequate analysis of the institutional setting and its possibilities to build such policies on. Such a – less ideology-driven – practical approach, combined with active participation of immigrants and their organizations, will not only avoid backlash effects among the majority population, it will also result in a practice in which immigrants are involved and feel recognized.

5. Immigration and integration policies in Europe: pressures for renewal?

As I have explained earlier, European states still predominantly try to handle international migration in a framework that is essentially based on nation-state premises. In such a framework the world is divided into separate political communities with its national citizens and territories: migration across political borders is an anomaly in such a system. As a consequence migration policies have been primarily defensive, control-centered instead of pro-active, and integration policies for immigrants reactive, if not absent. These two reinforce each other: the lack of a consistent and transparent immigration policy is an impediment for effective integration policies. The lack of consistent integration policies and the (real or perceived) blockage of integration processes of newcomers of increasingly divers origin lead in its turn to predominantly negative perceptions of migration and immigrants, and hence reinforce defensive immigration policies.
This situation pertains particularly to Northwest European countries that have a longer (post-war) tradition of immigration. This problematique is reflected in the cumbersome process of establishing migration and integration policies at the EU-level. A communitarian migration policy (as decided in the Amsterdam Treaty) is often felt as running counter to (perceived) national interest or is seen as a threat: “If we have more lenient immigration policies than our neighbours, the Netherlands is going to become the waste pipe of Europe”, as one Dutch politician expressed it explicitly. That leads to the immanent danger that such policies come down to the lowest common denominator of the EU-countries involved. The consequence of such perceptions and immigration policies is that integration policies at the EU-level are until now mainly limited to its negative formulation: combating exclusion, racism, xenophobia and discrimination. In most member states significant and comprehensive integration policies are absent, with a few exceptions as mentioned earlier.

Formulated in this way this is a gloomy picture indeed. On a more positive note, however, I see two important forces at work that may contribute to a way out of this stalemate. The first force is that of economic and political integration within the European Union. This integration may have worked as a negative force in the first phase, reinforcing the negative spiral mentioned above by taking away borders within the Union. Gradually, however, the awareness that only common, comprehensive and pro-active policies for migration and integration is the only way out, has grown. Both the dominant problems of today - unsolicited immigration – and the future problems of demographic decline and competitiveness (for wanted immigrants) can only be handled effectively in a common EU-frame. Along such arguments the earlier political statements in the Amsterdam Treaty and Tampere Summit are now gradually followed by suggestions for frameworks for comprehensive and pro-active policies, as expressed in the Communications on a Community Immigration Policy (2000) and on Immigration, Integration and Employment (2003). Furthermore agreement has been reached on a number of concrete directives. An important argument for some optimism here is that new immigration countries of the EU, not hampered by long traditions of reactive national policies in this field, act as a significant supportive force for such EU-initiatives. The Greek presidency at the Thessaloniki summit of June 2003 stands as a witness to this. Admittedly, the EU-process is slow and will probably take some more years of debate and negotiation, but it stands a good chance to act as a catalyst for new future policies of member states.
The second major force for change of national policies comes from within. As has become clear, European cities are the places where globalization becomes visible, both in its general consequences and in terms of its changing population. New immigrants that come as a direct or indirect consequence of globalization tend to settle in these cities and local politics and policies have to cope with the consequences. This may lead to tensions between the national arena and the local one, and to pressure for comprehensive integration policies. This pressure may take different forms: in countries such as Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria where national integration policies have been piecemeal or absent completely, the pressure to formulate adequate policies and claims for responsibilities and resources have come from their big cities: the cities of Zurich, Bern and Basel in Switzerland, for example, took – in the complete absence of such policies at the national level - the initiative of developing local policies (Leitbilder) in the late 1990s, while Berlin, Frankfurt and Vienna developed such policies earlier under the same conditions of absence of national policies and resources.

In countries where integration policies have started rather early on the national level, such as The Netherlands and Sweden, such tension take a different form: the major cities in these countries being confronted on a quite different scale with immigration than the average in the country, expressing itself in high pressure on essential institutions like the housing system (segregation and degeneration of neighbourhoods), the labour market (disproportionate unemployment, high levels of social benefit costs) and the educational system (concentration of pupils of immigrant origin in certain sectors and spaces) and public order (racial harassment, crime and tensions between groups) joined forces to claim more executive power and resources from the national government to cope with such problems. In these two countries general policies for Metropolitan areas and integration policies for immigrants were brought together – at least in the formal sense - in one framework in recent years, creating in principle new and more comprehensive possibilities.

Common to all these cases is that such tensions often lead to a critical dialogue between big cities and national governments on topics where national and local policies work out contradictory. Cities will not always win these battles on principle. At the same time, however, city authorities may use their discretionary power (and avoid public national debate on that) to gain more room to manoeuver in favour of (certain) immigrants. What such examples make clear – and this is the broader
message of it – is that the interests at stake in integration policies and its practice at the local level of cities may be substantially different, or perceived differently at the local and national level. At the city level the confrontation with the day-to-day consequences of immigration is much more direct (and the implications of policies more directly felt by immigrants). If any serious attempt to cope with these problems, or - in a positive formulation - to attempt to get the best gains of it, is taken at that level it will make pressure on the higher and more abstract national level. Part of the European metropoles and cities are increasingly becoming aware that they need a long term, consistent integration policies in order to remain viable as communal entities and liveable for all residents. Many of them realise that the absence of such policies would be nothing less than a recipe for disaster.

Finally the foregoing observations lead to a more normative conclusion as to the relation between policies at the local, national and supranational level. In our view cities should be given more resources, instruments and room to act in locally adequate ways. National policies, and by implication also EU-integration policies, should set general frameworks and rules, and make instruments and resources available that primarily legitimate and facilitate local policies and actors. The real work has to be done locally and it has to be done creatively in coalitions of actors.

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