The carnage of the Civil War arrived in the streets of New Orleans just over a decade late. While in 1862, the city had surrendered mostly peaceably to the Union Navy, simmering tensions had threatened the fragile peace ever since. On September 14, 1874, the political divisions of the postbellum city took shape in two opposing battle lines. On one side, a newly organized force, pledged by their leader to uphold “the rights of the colored as well as of the white race,” awaited further orders. Facing them, a ragtag militia, commanded by one of the highest-ranking former Confederate generals, arrayed itself along the downtown waterfront. With a sudden volley, the two armies launched into a combat which would soon claim far more lives than the Civil-War capture of New Orleans itself. While the extent of the bloodshed may have shocked New Orleanians, the clash seemingly pitted against each other the same elements which had been fighting since secession.

However, the smoke of battle obscured the truth about the combatants. The troops whose commander proclaimed protection of both races were actually members of the Crescent City White League, New Orleans’ foremost Redeemer organization. Meanwhile, the force under ex-Confederate James Longstreet was the integrated Metropolitan Police, the militia propping up

Louisiana’s Reconstruction government. Far from affirming the narrative of a cleanly divided social landscape, the events of September 1874 broke from that pattern altogether. Indeed, over the course of two days of rioting, the White Leaguers did not kill a single civilian African American, and in the aftermath, black leaders blamed corrupt Republican officials almost as strongly as the erstwhile Democratic usurpers.\(^4\) Of course, racial animus and partisan rivalry played large roles in what came to be known as the Battle of Canal Street or the Battle of Liberty Place. Nevertheless, though it may have pitted one army against another, the clash demonstrates that, in fact, three factions contested the course Reconstruction in Louisiana: white Redeemers, white Republicans, and the black community. Often lumped together with “carpetbaggers” and “scalawags,” New Orleans’ African Americans actually possessed independent political and social power—a fact recognized by both blacks and whites. During and after the battle, as the ascendant White League made overtures to blacks, tensions within the black-Republican coalition all but broke it apart. If such an alliance could not even hold together in the face of an existential threat like the White League, the Battle of Canal Street then epitomizes the broader problems of white-led Reconstruction across the South. Although the Redeemers may have lost the battle itself, a thorough examination of the causes, course, and consequences of the clash reveals the cracks which would eventually break Reconstruction for good.

Until relatively recently, histories of Reconstruction have given the black community little agency of its own. Up to the mid-twentieth century, historians of the so-called Dunning School presented a narrative of incurably corrupt carpetbaggers manipulating puerile blacks to get vengeance on the South, as exemplified in Louisiana by authors like Ella Lonn and Stuart

\(^4\) “Caution,” *Weekly Louisianian* (New Orleans) (hereafter *Louisianian*), Sept. 26, 1874, 2; H.A. Haugh to John R. Ficklen, May 9, 1894, Folder 22, Box 1, John Wesley Blassingame Papers, MS 737, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT (hereafter Blassingame Papers), 1, 3-4; Hogue, *Uncivil War*, 66; Stuart Omer Landry, *The Battle of Liberty Place: The Overthrow of Carpet-Bag Rule in New Orleans—September 14, 1874* (New Orleans, Pelican, 1955), 1, 57; and “The Slanders against Our People and Cause,” *Daily Picayune* (hereafter *Picayune*), Sept. 19, 1874, 4. All subsequent cited material from the Blassingame Papers is from Box 1.
Landry. As the Civil Rights Movement came to the fore, however, a set of revisionist historians reversed the heroes and villains, vindicating the good intentions of white Republicans. Still, blacks remained allies, never truly leaders, in this “unfinished revolution.” More recent scholarship, on the other hand, has placed black activism and self-determination at the center of the story, as typified by Eric Foner’s work. In Louisiana, post-revisionists like James Hogue and Justin Nystrom have used political-science and socio-cultural lenses, respectively, to complicate the state’s Reconstruction. Still, little scholarship has explicitly focused on tensions between blacks and white Republicans, and none on how such tensions played out at the Battle of Canal Street. Indeed, historians still debate the basic terms of engagement between blacks and whites in postbellum Southern society: authors like James Blassingame and Howard Rabinowitz have respectively argued for and against C. Vann Woodward’s image of a surprisingly integrated pre-Jim-Crow South. In this ever-shifting historiographical landscape, a space for independent black political power has opened. While the Battle of Canal Street may have been just one riot in one somewhat atypical Southern city, a look at black self-assertion in the months and years surrounding the clash offers one of the best ways of further unlocking this rediscovered story.

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New Orleans of the 1870’s was a racial, social, and political kaleidoscope. Over the

course of Reconstruction, the city’s diverse communities each blended and separated in ever-varying coalitions, whose perceived makeup often depended on one’s own position. Typifying these swirling complexities, an 1875 Harper’s Weekly piece on the city’s integrated schools summed up New Orleans’ idiosyncrasies. Only in New Orleans, among towns in the South, were schools even close to fully integrated. Moreover, only in New Orleans would a mob set on expelling black girls from primary schools have been bested by parental and administrative opposition, as Harper’s related. But most tellingly, only in New Orleans, with its heritage of racial mixing, would the mob’s captain have accidentally accused a White League leader’s daughter of being black! From integration in public spaces to fracturing in racial identity to success in black office-seeking, New Orleans offered a unique setting for the nuances of Reconstruction to play out.  

Thus, only by looking through the kaleidoscopic lens of the city’s social environment does the Battle of Canal Street begin to make sense.

The roots of New Orleans’ political and racial makeup trace back to its earliest days. Colonized by the French and then held by the Spanish, Americans, and Confederates, the city retained a distinctive culture apart from both the rest of the South and the rest of the nation. In Louisiana, French, Caribbean, and African influences created a thriving Creole community of largely mixed-race freemen whose social mobility, racial ambiguity, and, in some cases, antebellum slave-ownership threatened the core tenets of white supremacy. Alongside these self-styled gens de colour libre lived generally poorer ex-slaves from across the South, who lacked the longstanding civil society of the Creoles. The city’s white population was perhaps even more divided. White Creoles, whites from the rest of the South, Northerners, and European

immigrants—all divided among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews—uneasily co-existed in New Orleans. Down to its very demographics, the South’s largest port and most cosmopolitan city complicates a binary narrative of Reconstruction.\textsuperscript{8}

But if the black community was fragmented, it nevertheless managed to achieve incredible social success in the postbellum years. While New Orleans did not, of course, represent an integrated utopia, few other locales in the South could rival the Crescent City in terms of the social position of African Americans. For instance, as Harper’s Weekly noted, New Orleans desegregated from one third to one half of its public schools, eighty years before Brown \textit{v. Board}. Streetcars, opera houses, churches, and sports leagues all experienced piecemeal integration after an 1869 state law forbidding discrimination in places open to the public. These steps forward, often made in the face of fierce opposition, were won via black political and legal maneuvers. For example, the \textit{Louisianian}, the city’s foremost black newspaper, lauded the success of civil rights lawsuits at forcing integration after one instance when the courts fined a local confectionery for denying a black woman a soda.\textsuperscript{9} On the other hand, when implementation of school integration began to flounder in 1877, the \textit{Louisianian} did not attack Redeemers, but rather blamed white Republican officials for being “base hypocrites…not in sympathy with the people whose cause they pretend to espouse.”\textsuperscript{10} Instead, black-only ward organizations and social clubs formed to drive societal change themselves. While many, if not most, antidiscrimination lawsuits and statutes failed to have sustained impact, the success blacks did


\textsuperscript{10} “White and Colored Schools,” \textit{Louisianian}, Oct. 6, 1877, 2.
enjoy came about primarily through self-driven political action.¹¹

Buttressing these societal reforms, blacks wielded immense electoral power, both through the ballot box and the influence of black elected officials. The most storied of these leaders, P.B.S. Pinchback, became famous for his effective yet Machiavellian dealings.¹² Indeed, while Northern papers reported white political corruption, the *New Orleans Times* asked of Pinchback and his allies, “Have they not served their country by plundering the tax payers [too]?”¹³

Ironically demonstrating blacks’ equality in both the good and the bad, Pinchback earned enough respect in the Louisiana black community that a black baseball team even named themselves “the Pinchbacks.” During the Election of 1872, Pinchback’s political acumen was on full display.

Four years earlier, a charismatic, twenty-six-year-old carpetbagger named Henry Clay Warmoth won the governorship under a new constitution. But after a term’s worth of corruption and backroom deals, the 1872 race divided the state into five factions. The Customs House Ring, a Republican political machine led by President Grant’s brother-in-law, opposed Warmoth’s Liberal Republicans, who backed Horace Greeley for president. Meanwhile, Democrats divided between hardliners and the Reform Party, a business coalition who tried to make overtures to black voters. As a result, Pinchback’s group of black legislators held the balance of power.¹⁴

Emphatically rejecting the Reform Party’s outreach, the Pinchback-owned *Louisianian* pointedly noted that “colored men are good to support a candidate, but not good enough to travel on the same steamboat.”¹⁵ Also bucking Warmoth for his lukewarm civil rights stance, Pinchback joined the Customs House Ring against a Fusionist alliance of the other three factions. Both sides

12. For an example of how Dunning School historians have treated Pinchback, see Landry, *Battle of Liberty Place*, 13: “Among the colorful (no pun intended) personalities of the Reconstruction era in Louisiana was Pickney Benton Pinchback…”
committed massive electoral fraud, and then both claimed victory. Amidst the chaos, Pinchback organized New Orleans blacks to contest the results and then, incredibly, managed to impeach the lame-duck Warmoth and elevate himself to become the nation’s first black governor.

Pinchback then quelled a militia mutiny and handed the government over to his successor, William Pitt Kellogg, not long after. In the process, he demonstrated that all sides recognized the power of the black vote and the influence of black leaders.

These successes, however, proved fragile. First, the legislature elected Pinchback to the U.S. Senate, but, much to the black community’s consternation, the Senate refused to seat him. Meanwhile, John McEnery, the Democratic-Fusionist candidate for governor, established a rival state government a few blocks from Kellogg’s in downtown New Orleans, then the state capital.

While the Grant administration recognized Kellogg as the rightful governor, it refused to stop McEnery’s shadow legislature from meeting. In the face of all this turmoil, the white business leaders and Creole elites of New Orleans proposed a joint plan ostensibly to share power and throw out the demagogues of both parties. While commerce and class interests played a much larger role than racial goodwill, the so-called Unification Movement again shows that blacks held power independent of—and potentially severable from—white Republicans. Nevertheless, opposition both from conservative whites and non-Creole blacks dashed the hopes of Unification’s backers. With the failure of this last attempt at compromise, Democrats, white Republicans, and blacks all began to mobilize for a fight.

On July 1, 1874, The Daily Picayune, New Orleans’ premier conservative paper, announced the formation of the Crescent City White League. An organization of mostly veterans and their younger brothers, the White Leaguers ranged from middle-class shopkeepers to city elites, including Edward White, who years later joined the majority Plessy v. Ferguson opinion as a Supreme Court justice.\textsuperscript{18} As Governor Kellogg later dryly testified, the League included “some of the best men in the city, unexceptional in their private relation except that they were outside the law.”\textsuperscript{19} Incorporated into a somewhat decentralized network of state White Leagues, the Crescent City branch recognized in its very platform that blacks possessed a significant—and dangerous—amount of power, independent of the carpetbaggers. Among a series of causes for outrage, the platform lists blacks’ “incessant demands for offices…[and] the development in their conventions of a spirit of proscription against…even honorable Republicans.”\textsuperscript{20} Along these lines, the League published an inflammatory leaflet asking, “SONS OF LOUISIANA, ARE YOU SLAVES?”\textsuperscript{21} To the League’s white audience, blacks posed such a political threat that they could conceivably turn the tables to enslave whites. In statements geared at a more general readership, Leaguers moderated their language, but the recognition of black organization remained. “For years,” noted one announcement, “the negroes have been organized in the interest of their own race”; as such, the White League, down to its very name, was purportedly just a response to these alleged black leagues.\textsuperscript{22} In fact, the Picayune trumpeted Black League plans for a huge riot the day before it announced the White League’s formation. The League even went as far as

\textsuperscript{18} “Civil War and Revolution,” Louisianaian, Sept. 19, 1874, 2; “Crescent City Club: Its Complete Reorganization as a White League,” Picayune, Jul. 1, 1874, 1; Hogue, Uncivil War, 128-31; Landry, Battle of Liberty Place, 67, 233; and Nystrom, New Orleans after the Civil War, 162, 183-5.

\textsuperscript{19} Condition of the South (hearing before the Select Comm. on the Condition of the South) 43rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 201 (1875) (statement of William P. Kellogg, Governor of Louisiana).


\textsuperscript{21} “Sons of Louisiana, Are You Slaves?,” leaflet, n.d., Folder 22, Blassingame Papers.

\textsuperscript{22} “To the White People of the Parish of Iberia, Louisiana,” Louisiana Sugar Bowl, Jul. 19, 1874, quoted in Landry, Battle of Liberty Place, 54.
testifying before Congress that it was reacting to comparable black groups. Of course, Redeemers all over the South claimed that Republican rule would lead to “Africanization,” but in New Orleans, the League did not merely view blacks as henchmen of the carpetbagger. The Crescent City White League based its existence upon the public assertion that blacks were an electoral and social force, in and of themselves.

White Leaguers did not just invent the rising tide of black political incorporation. As the *Louisianian* printed frequent reminders to register to vote, the *Picayune* noted with dismay that the pace of black registration had doubled that of whites in certain wards. Moreover, locales where blacks organized most—and especially places where White Leaguers recognized as much—became the sites of the greatest White League violence. For instance, a White League official in the exceptionally violent parish of Caddo noted not only that the three-fourths-black electorate sent “big, burly, black [negroes]” to the state house, but also that they seemed to hold the upper hand over the white Republican representative “sandwiched between them.” The Crescent City White Leaguers shared such observations. Written twenty years afterward, White Leaguer H.A. Haugh’s reminiscence of the Battle of Canal Street rages against the city’s all-black clubs and the “mongrel crew” which held up the Kellogg government. As even the White Leaguers could tell, blacks had gained near equal political footing with white Republicans.

While firmly denouncing the White League, prominent blacks used their newfound strength to criticize white Republicans almost as harshly. In an anti-White-League editorial a week before the riot, the *Louisianian* could not help decrying the fact that “Reconstruction,

25. N.C. Blanchard to Jno. R. Ficklen, Feb. 9, 1903, Folder 22, Blassingame Papers, 1, 3.
26. Haugh to Ficklen, May 9, 1894, 1, 3-4.
though accomplishing a great good…[has] mixed it with such a base alloy of selfishness.”

While his paper’s motto may have been “Republican at all times, and under all circumstances,” Pinchback himself chastised national Republicans in a speech in Cincinnati, saying they lacked confidence in the abilities of Southern blacks and only timidly pursued civil rights. He also suggested that not every black alliance with ex-slaveholders was counterproductive. Even Kellogg’s own lieutenant governor, Pinchback’s Creole rival C.C. Antoine, told a reporter that a majority of state voters would prefer Pinchback to Kellogg. To be sure, other black politicians, like T.T. Allain, took pains to establish that no independent “Black Man’s Party” existed or was planned. Nevertheless, instead of uniting in the face of the greatest threat so far to Republican government, the party began to splinter along racial lines.

By September 13, 1874, the Big Easy sat uneasy. Over the preceding week, the Metropolitan Police, Governor Kellogg’s militia, had begun finding and seizing arms from suspected White League plotters. Commanded by former Union officer Algernon Badger and former Confederate general James Longstreet, the Metropolitans contained both black and white regiments, all of whom were put on alert. The day before, the steamer Mississippi had docked with a shipment of arms likely for the League. With the region’s Federal troops in summer camp almost four hundred miles away, the Metropolitans formed a perimeter around the levee dock. Seemingly spontaneously, handbills began appearing around the city, calling for a closing of all stores and a mass meeting to protest the usurping Kellogg government. Unbeknownst to the

Reconstruction commanders, a coup to install McEnery’s Democratic shadow legislature had been planned days before by Crescent City White League commander Frederick Ogden and Democratic Lieutenant-Governor-claimant D.B. Penn. As rumors flew, regiments of White Leaguers took up arms and prepared to meet at designated safe-houses.31

September 14th dawned like any other New Orleans day. In the morning, the streets filled with ladies shopping, as if it were a holiday. By happenstance, soon-to-be-enemies Badger and Penn exchanged friendly greetings on the streetcar. By 11:00 A.M., though, crowds of angry men had gathered on Canal Street at the foot of a statue of Henry Clay. Unlike the man sculpted above them, the assemblage was in no mood to compromise. Chanting “Hang Kellogg!,” the crowd roared its assent when a committee was sent to demand the governor’s abdication, only to be denied a meeting. Ominously, the core of the White League’s regiments and military leadership remained absent from the rally, out of sight of the Metropolitans. From this position, Penn declared himself acting governor, justifying that he and McEnery rightfully won the 1872 election but that McEnery was out of state. In coordination, White Leaguers seized City Hall and cut the telegraph hub there, incapacitating the Metropolitans’ response.32 Even amidst this flurry of activity, the League leadership took pains to show that racial animus played no role in the coup. In the proclamation “To the Colored People of the State of Louisiana,” Penn wrote, “In the grand movement now on foot against the enormities of the rule of the Kellogg usurpation, rest assured no harm is meant towards you….The rights of the colored as well as of the white race we are determined to uphold and defend.”33 Statements from League orator R.H. Marr and Mayor

32. “Civil War and Revolution”; “The Deadly Issue…..” Times, Sept. 15, 1874, 1, 8; Landry, Battle of Liberty Place, 156; “Mass Meeting…..,” Picayune, Sept. 15, 1874, 1; S.B. Packard to George H. Williams, telegram, Sept. 14, 1874, in Handbook of Politics, 22; D.B. Penn, “To the People of Louisiana,” Sept. 14, 1874, in Handbook of Politics, 24; and “Troublous Times…..”
33. Penn, “To the Colored People.”
Louis Wiltz echoed these sentiments. While no reflection of genuine desire for racial harmony, these words were no formality either, especially compared to the triumphantly racist rhetoric of Redeemers elsewhere. The most racially complex battle of Reconstruction was about to begin.

The Metropolitans tried their best to regain control of the city. At first, the militia confronted the mobs at the Clay Statue, but Badger and Longstreet soon realized the true threat from the White League force advancing toward the arms aboard the Mississippi. Establishing a defensive line, the Metropolitans fired the day’s first volley, at White Leaguers hidden behind cotton bales nearby. Outgunned but better trained, the Leaguers charged the Metropolitans, who broke and ran after General Badger fell critically wounded. Amidst mass desertions spurred by promises of amnesty, the Metropolitan Police dissolved into the chaos, as Longstreet tried to rally them before falling from his horse. By the next morning, White Leaguers had taken control of the statehouse, arsenal, and police station, leaving Governor Kellogg to flee to the federally-protected customs house. On the 15th, the League staged an inauguration for Penn, as White League branches across the state began to depose their own local officials. After 1,500 White Leaguers had fought almost 1,000 Metropolitans—leaving at least twenty-seven dead and over one hundred wounded—an odd sense of normalcy set in over New Orleans. Even the city’s black residents appeared around town “in a very satisfied mood,” at least if the Picayune is to be believed.

President Grant did not receive the news so matter-of-factly. Despite cautions from the

36. “Re-Inauguration…..”
37. “Finished…..”
Northern press and a personal telegram from Penn, Grant ordered General William Emory’s troops to restore order in New Orleans. Coincidentally arriving to assume the governorship on the same train as Emory, John McEnery recognized the futility of further resistance, surrendering the government to military governor John Brooke on the 17th. Indeed, the White League government vanished so fast, the New Orleans Times ran the headline “Presto!!” the next day.³⁸ Still, Kellogg, who soon resumed the governorship himself, faced the difficult tasks of reconstituting the Metropolitan Police and governing a hostile populace which had proved more powerful than he.³⁹ While the status quo had been restored, state conservatives had won a significant moral victory. “Putting aside the first feeling of chagrin over the culmination of our movement,” the Picayune opined, “…we find the Louisiana case, in its present stage, full of hopeful significance.”⁴⁰ For now, the conflict in the streets was over. In the press and in popular perception, however, battles over race, politics, and power had just begun.

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For Northern papers, the events of September 14th raised key questions over the viability of the carpetbaggers’ government, the legality of the Redeemers’ coup, and the appropriateness of Grant’s response.⁴¹ Largely glossed over or simplified in the North, however, the racial terms of the battle became a point of contention, which Southerners on all sides scrambled to define. For their part, the Democrats continued to stress not only that they treated blacks well, but also that blacks should prefer their rule to white Republicans’. In near-daily editorials, the Picayune

stated that Governor Penn would “risk his own life and that of all his friends” for blacks,\(^{42}\) that blacks returned his loyalty with “an enthusiasm which they have never manifested for any Radical white chief,”\(^{43}\) and that Southern whites “are, and have always been, [blacks’] best friends.”\(^{44}\) Alongside the editorials, reports of blacks celebrating the coup and congratulating Penn in person appeared frequently in the *Picayune*. Like the proclamations during the battle, these pieces were aimed at eliciting Northern support and averting Grant’s retribution, as Nystrom argues. However, this explanation misses the actions which accompanied the words. For one thing, not a single civilian black was killed or injured during the chaos of the battle or the two days of White League control.\(^ {45}\) Moreover, of all the state Republican officials, the White League kept only one in office: black state treasurer Antoine Dubuclet.\(^ {46}\) Leaving a Republican in charge of state finances and enforcing enough discipline to prevent any black civilian causalities—these were more than mere symbolic acts for a Northern audience.

Of course, the League did not act out of any true love for blacks. As if to prove as much, the *Picayune* raised the threat of an “Africanized” state on the same page as a racially accommodating editorial!\(^ {47}\) Rather, the League recognized the independent political power of the black community and sought at least its assent, if not necessarily its support. As such, Democrats quickly developed a strategy of cleaving blacks from white Republicans in the wake of the battle. Thus, they charged that Kellogg, of all people, had been trying to remove Dubuclet due to his race—and that Penn would keep him in office. Responding to a piece in the *Louisianian*, the

\(^{42}\) “Gov. Penn and the Colored People,” *Picayune*, Sept. 16, 1874, 4.
\(^{43}\) “Proclamation of the Acting Governor,” *Picayune*, Sept. 15, 1874, 4.
\(^{44}\) “Organization of the Police.,” *Picayune*, Sept. 16, 1874, 1.
\(^{45}\) While Nystrom has found one case of a black trolleyman shot by unknown assailants (174), both blacks and whites at the time agreed that no black civilians had been killed or injured by the White League. See “Caution”; Haugh to Ficklen, May 9, 1894, 5; and “Slanders against Our People.”
\(^{46}\) “Gov. Penn and the Colored People”; “The People’s Movement and the People’s Representative.,” *Picayune*, Sept. 16, 1874, 4; “Louisiana Case”; Nystrom, *New Orleans after the Civil War*, 171; and “Slanders against Our People.”
editors of the *Picayune* asserted that carpetbaggers represented their common enemy. And while the *Picayune* readily suggested shooting white Republican agitators on sight, they openly encouraged the black community to choose independent leaders of its own.\(^48\) While very different from the League’s earlier opposition to black organization, this new racial outreach reflected the same feeling: a recognition of black political power and a desire to make use of it.

On the surface, responses from the black community evinced nothing but outrage at the White League. Not mincing words, P.B.S. Pinchback characterized Leaguers as “fire-eating, murderous desperadoes [with] hot-headed, short-sighted leaders.”\(^49\) However, in that same speech in Indianapolis, Pinchback offered a telling explanation of the League’s actions: “It is not the negro they hate, nor do they murder him because he is a negro….It is the Republican [Party] they hate, and the colored men are butchered because they are Republicans.”\(^50\) Conservative whites, he argued, attacked his people only because of their political power and how they aligned it. The belief that the League placed politics above prejudice led some black leaders to moderate their stance toward the League. For example, the *Louisianian* suggested that the lack of black civilian casualties bolstered the League’s credibility. Going further, the *Louisianian* often responded to League criticisms by pivoting to complain about white Republicans. Attacked for rapaciously seeking all state offices for blacks, the editors replied that blacks actually held very few positions—principally because of carpetbagger schemes against them. Blacks’ alliance with white Republicans, Pinchback and others made clear, stemmed only from mutual necessity for survival, not because the latter treated the former particularly well. In fact, in a sign of how little blacks’ trusted white Republicans in the wake of the riot, the *Louisianian* accused some

\(^50\) Ibid.
Republicans of stealthily joining the Leaguers during the battle. While the White League remained the principle enemy, the Battle of Canal Street revealed just how weak the black-carpetbagger alliance had become.

Debates over the conduct of the black Metropolitans drove the wedge deeper between white and black Republicans. After the battle, rumors circulated that the black regiments had fled their white brethren at the first volley. The police generals, seeking a scapegoat, court-marshalled two black officers for “disobedience of orders” and “neglect of duty.” Affronted, black leaders furiously denied the allegations. Firing back, Major Thomas Chester, a prominent attorney, retorted that if anyone had shown cowardice in battle, it was Governor Kellogg, who ran to the safety of the customs house at the first opportunity. Many blacks took offense at criticisms of the Metropolitans as attacks on their people’s manhood. “In a word, the black citizen from now on needs to be regarded as a man,” wrote the Louisianian. “…He will permit no more the dictation of superserviceable advisors who by reason of assumed party affiliation play the leaders.” If white Republicans impugned black manhood, blacks threatened to abide by their leadership no longer. Taking advantage of this schism, Penn played a crafty middle ground, claiming to the New York Herald that the black Metropolitans withheld their fire not out of cowardice, but out of dislike for Kellogg. Blacks and white Republicans could not stay united even after a bloody battle, and even the White League noticed.

White Republicans ineffectually tried to reunite the party. Unsurprisingly, carpetbagger

51. Ibid.; “Address of the Committee of Seventy,,” Louisianian, Sept. 26, 1874, 2; “Caution”; and “Civil War and Revolution.”
leaders stressed the shared destiny of black and white Republicans, who, as General Hugh Campbell analogized, sat together on one side of a delicately balanced scale. Speaking to a black Republican club, Governor Kellogg reiterated the same themes, none-too-subtly reminding his audience that they owed their freedom to the Republican Party. However, white Republicans’ actions did not match their words. A week after the battle, Kellogg met with Penn, McEnery, and other Leaguers to try to work out a compromise. The proposed agreement would have replaced the two black members of the powerful board in charge of tallying elections with white conservatives. The *Louisianian* fiercely denounced the plan, which soon fell apart.\(^{56}\) Next, Kellogg fired a black police commissioner without explanation, causing the *Louisianian* to remark that if there was perhaps a satisfactory reason, “Gov. Kellogg’s acts towards his colored [constituents] gave us no good cause for the supposition.”\(^{57}\) Finally, Republicans in Jefferson Parish threatened to endorse a white challenger for Pinchback’s still-unresolved Senate seat, though the *Louisianian* assured its readers that they could outvote such a challenge. Fed up with white Republicans, the *Louisianian* incredibly joined the *Picayune* in endorsing a proposed joint slate of blacks and conservative whites in Terrebonne Parish against the carpetbaggers.\(^{58}\) Only weeks after white Republican power had proven so fragile, the black political community proceeded to undermine it further.

> By October, tensions had only increased. Turning against fellow blacks, the *Louisianian* savaged those “sycophantic tools of the administration, who have been put into petty offices as a reward for their dirty work and treachery to their race.”\(^{59}\)


\(^{57}\) “Yet Another.,” *Louisianian*, Sept. 26, 1874, 3.


\(^{59}\) “Significant.,” *Louisianian*, Oct. 10, 1874, 2.
sixteen black leaders, including Pinchback and court-marshalled Metropolitan Emile Detiege, issued a powerful statement. While the authors began with assurances of their loyalty to the GOP, they spelled out their complaints in consciously racial terms: “The Republican Party in this state, since [Reconstruction], has been manipulated and controlled by men as much bleached in complexion and politics as the most rampant [White Leaguer].”60 Kellogg’s regime depended upon black support, they noted, yet its corruption embarrassed them and its mistreatment of blacks angered them. Even black officeholders under Kellogg received harsh criticism. As the November election neared, the schism turned violent in West Feliciana Parish, where a black candidate faced a white Republican amidst assassination attempts and rioting. The election itself, again wracked with fraud, ended with Democrats taking a national majority in the House and making major but uncertain gains in the state legislature.61 The Louisianian, however, saw the results positively, concluding, “the colored race…can no longer be used by designing, selfish and unscrupulous white demagogues.”62 But in April, state Republican leadership agreed to the Wheeler Compromise, in which they acknowledged a majority-Democratic state house in return for Democratic acceptance of Kellogg’s legitimacy. As a result, almost a third of black state representatives lost their seats.63 The same blocs who had fought side by side in September now attacked each other both politically and militarily, to the White League’s benefit.

Reconstruction in Louisiana lasted two and a half more years after the Battle of Canal Street, but its downfall began in the streets of New Orleans that September day. From that point onward, the coalition supporting Reconstruction could not be repaired. After the battle, no black units joined the state militia, while after an extensive congressional investigation, no White

63. Hogue, Uncivil War, 154-7 and “Sowing the Wind.,” Louisianian, Apr. 17, 1875.
Leaguer was ever prosecuted. And when the next election approached in 1876, the Democrats adapted from the lessons they had learned at the battle. The party nominated Francis Nicholls, a patrician heretofore uninvolved in politics, who sought out black endorsements and who may have won a small but nontrivial portion of the black vote. Meanwhile, Pinchback and other black leaders only halfheartedly campaigned for their nominee, Stephen Packard. When the election results yet again fell into dispute, Nicholls established a full parallel government, complete with courts and tax collection, instead of trying another coup. All the while, he publically urged racial toleration and avoided violence. The lame-duck Grant had neither the desire nor the political capital to intervene, while Hayes was willing to make an implicit deal with Nicholls to ensure his own election to the presidency. Even Pinchback threw in his lot with Nicholls as federal troops withdrew from the South. Thus, the schisms which opened at the Battle of Canal Street eventually contributed to the downfall of Reconstruction nationally.64

However, despite the apparent “redeeming” of Louisiana in 1877, black political power remained. For decades, Bourbon and reformist Democrats actively vied for the black vote, a key swing constituency. In fact, twenty-six parishes had more black registrants than whites even in 1896. Despite an 1879 constitution allowing for segregation, the thorough establishment of blacks in the public sphere stalled Jim Crow for many more years. Blacks rode integrated streetcars until 1902 and maintained informal integration in many other arenas until the late 1880’s. Sixteen blacks even sat in the state legislature during the debate over the law that later sparked the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision. Only in 1898 did the state disenfranchise black voters,

over twenty years after White Leaguers poured down Canal Street. By then, the Redeemers may have completed what they started the morning of September 14th, but their task took so long because blacks’ autonomous power did not collapse even when Reconstruction did.

Achieving white supremacy was a process of trial and error. Eventually, racial conservatives came to realize that supremacy required monolithic support, or else blacks would hold the balance of power between rival whites. From populism’s alliance of the agrarian poor to the Civil Rights Movement’s employment of white activists, white disunity presented white supremacy with one of its greatest threats—and thus met with some of its most severe backlash. However, the need for undivided white support had to be learned. In the turbulent times after the Civil War, when the whole social and economic structure of half the nation had been upended, forces on all sides had little certainty of what strategies to take or what direction to go. Thus, to gloss over White League outreach to blacks—however insincere and politically motivated it may have been—is to impart a false teleology to the past. Similarly, discounting black critiques of white Republicans as short-sighted and self-destructive ignores the genuine sources of distrust and dissatisfaction engendered by carpetbagger betrayals. Thus, reducing Reconstruction to a dualistic game of heroes and villains, as historians of the era long did, neither fits with events like the Battle of Canal Street nor offers much guidance for current and future racial encounters. As long as blacks have had white allies, from Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Movement to the present, tensions over differing goals have threatened their tenuous coalitions. The Battle of Canal Street demonstrates that even after fighting side by side in a deadly clash of arms, such an

alliance was far from certain.

In 1882, the Redeemer government of New Orleans erected a monument on the site of the battle. On it, the names of the White League dead were proudly engraved. Yet only in 1932, after the black organization of the previous century had finally been marginalized, did the obelisk gain an inscription lauding those who “recognized white supremacy and gave us our state.”67 Since then, city leaders added another plaque disavowing the monument’s supremacist sentiments, but controversy still rages. Members of today’s reinvigorated black community have tried to remove or even vandalize the obelisk, while David Duke has led KKK rallies on the site. However even today, the fight is not two-sided: historical preservationists and moderate whites have sought to repurpose the monument to honor all participants in the battle, but leave it standing.68 Over 140 years after the Battle of Canal Street, the legacy of that September day still divides blacks from their erstwhile white allies in a continual three-party debate. Though the record of the battle is literally etched in stone, the legacy of black political power may chisel it into a new form.

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Since South Carolina was the catalyst, we will start there. The Secession Convention of that state produced a document entitled, "Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union". Speculating on alternative history is always problematic, but I believe that it's useful in this case for the purposes of showing just how bad of an idea secession really was for the South in 1860. Below are four scenarios that might have occurred had South Carolina (and by extension the rest of the eventual Confederacy) held tight after Lincoln's election and not withdrawn from the Union. At a high level the alternatives I outline are as follows: 2 - In fact this very split eventually developed within the Republican Party over the failures of Reconstruction. This essay will discuss the main positive and negative aspects of focusing on practise (1) instead of theory. Generally speaking, acquiring practical skills has become essential for every job seeker. Therefore, the majority of job interviewers require from their candidates some technical experience to cover a certain position. In addition to this, internships and traineeships play a crucial role in preparing recent graduates for working life. This essay discussed the main advantages and drawbacks of this statement. Whether practise plays a more vital role than theory or not, it is clear that they are both significant in modern life. 268 words. Carmel never stops working. She is the most (ENERGY) girl I've ever met. Unfortunately, (FORTUNE), I couldn't go to my son's birthday party yesterday. Apart from her dyed hair, Ann has remained (CHANGE) since I last saw her all those years ago. Inhabitants. The authorities have warned the (INHABIT) not to drink the water. My father is a history professor and his (SPECIAL) is the English monarchy. Wonderful. We had a (WONDER) time on our holiday and would definitely go back.